Frequently asked questions

Although AES-256 (NIST Level 1 security) is secure, asymmetric algorithms are used to establish the symmetric key they use. RSA and ECC are no longer secure, so the NIST post-quantum algorithms must be used.

To get the best performance from the NIST post-quantum algorithms, our solution must be used in place of TLS. The challenge with AES is not in the algorithm. It is in the transmission of the key.

It will be possible for quantum computers to intercept the key transmission and decrypt the data. In addition, we are also expanding on AES and the universal hashing algorithm it uses to enable NIST Level 3 and Level 5 security.

QuProtect R3 supports a FIPS 140-3 mode of operation and runs at DoD Impact Level 2. The DoD Cloud Computing Security Requirements Guide aligns that level with the FedRAMP Moderate baseline. Impact Level 6 authorization is in progress, sponsored through an Air Force TACFI award.

QuProtect R3 is available on Carahsoft’s GSA Multiple Award Schedule under contract 47QSWA18D008F, and through SEWP V, ITES-SW2, NASPO ValuePoint and OMNIA Partners.

QuProtect R3 is available to state and local government through NASPO ValuePoint and OMNIA Partners, and on Carahsoft’s GSA Multiple Award Schedule under contract 47QSWA18D008F. It is software, so there is no hardware line on the requisition.

While quantum computing is still an emerging field, leading experts in the industry believe that a CRQC (Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computer), a quantum computer that can break current cryptography, will be available within the next 3-5 years.

Additionally, nation-state attackers are stealing encrypted data that will be retroactively decrypted once a CRQC is available. This is a well-documented attack campaign strategy known as ‘Steal Now Decrypt Later.’ It is estimated that nation-state attackers have stolen up to 25% of global encrypted data.

China has also dedicated a $100B budget to developing a CRQC with over 1,100 quantum engineers working on the project.

Enterprises need to take measures now to comply with future NIST post-quantum standards and assume fiduciary responsibility for their data security.

A security company. QuProtect uses NIST post-quantum algorithms implemented in software. It needs no quantum hardware and no quantum computer.

Harvest now, decrypt later is a threat model in which adversaries capture encrypted data today and store it until future quantum computers can decrypt it. This makes quantum risk relevant now, especially for sensitive data that must remain confidential for years.

Also discussed in Beyond the Noise: Why Recent Quantum Advances Make Crypto-Agility a Board-Level Conversation

Timelines remain uncertain, but recent research from Google suggests the required resources may be lower than previously estimated.

Also discussed in Google Just Showed Where Quantum Breaks First: Why Cryptographic Exposure Management Matters Now

Recent quantum computing research has continued to reduce estimates for the resources needed to threaten RSA and elliptic curve cryptography. While these results do not mean a cryptographically relevant quantum computer exists today, they show that the gap is narrowing and that organizations should prepare before the transition becomes urgent.

Also discussed in Beyond the Noise: Why Recent Quantum Advances Make Crypto-Agility a Board-Level Conversation

Quantum computers are expected to break widely used encryption methods like RSA and ECC using Shor’s algorithm. However, large-scale practical attacks are not possible yet.

Also discussed in Google Just Showed Where Quantum Breaks First: Why Cryptographic Exposure Management Matters Now

No. The mainframe keeps negotiating what it always has; the encryptor beside it carries the connection over post-quantum TLS. No recompile, no vendor engagement.

Organizations should combine discovery, phased hybrid deployment, centralized governance, and crypto-agile infrastructure to introduce NIST-approved PQC without operational disruption.

Also discussed in Quantum-Resilient Cybersecurity for Government Networks

Agencies prepare by building cryptographic inventories, prioritizing long-lived sensitive data, deploying hybrid and post-quantum protections in phases, and adopting crypto-agile infrastructure.

Also discussed in Quantum-Resilient Cybersecurity for Government Networks

No. QuProtect R3 uses NIST post-quantum algorithms implemented in software, and it does not use quantum key distribution, so it needs no dedicated optical link, no quantum hardware and no quantum computer.

The same three questions. A CA compromise asks where this cryptography is in use, what depends on it, and how fast it can be changed, for a handful of certificates over one week. The post-quantum migration asks the same of every certificate, connection and device at once, when RSA and elliptic-curve algorithms have to be replaced. The teams with cryptographic visibility treat the first as a drill for the second; the rest run the drill at enterprise scale.

Also discussed in When Trust Breaks: What 8 Compromised TLS Certificates Mean for Your Enterprise

NSA states that post-quantum cryptography is currently more scalable and practical than QKD for National Security Systems because QKD requires specialized infrastructure and introduces operational complexity.

Also discussed in Quantum-Resilient Cybersecurity for Government Networks

The most effective solutions combine NIST-approved PQC, crypto-agility, centralized cryptographic governance, hybrid migration support, and compatibility with existing infrastructure.

Also discussed in Quantum-Resilient Cybersecurity for Government Networks

QuProtect R3 supports ML-KEM (FIPS 203) and ML-DSA (FIPS 204) usage in TLS, including hybrid post-quantum key exchange X25519MLKEM768, pure post-quantum key exchange ML-KEM-1024, and ML-DSA certificates.

Anyone can use the NIST algorithms as they will be open-source/open standard. However, these algorithms are not simply plug-and-play; surrounding security processes and systems can still be vulnerable.

A holistic Post Quantum cybersecurity solution is best if you want the best performance from the algorithms.

QKD implementations lack maturity and face significant challenges regarding long-distance entanglement, one-to-many, and many-to-many configurations.

Given the imminent rise of quantum computers, a different (more feasible) approach is needed to secure the sockets layer in time.

QKD is also expensive and focused on backhaul fiber connections. NSA recently pushed guidelines for quantum security and reiterated that QKD would not be viable for a general deployment of quantum security.

Yes. Encryptors apply new algorithms per connection at the network layer while systems keep running. In production this has meant estate-wide rotation with no outage.

Yes. Reports export on demand in machine-readable and human-readable form, covering the cryptography in use, the policy in force and the record of changes, which is the evidence a cryptography control objective usually asks for.

Yes. Modern crypto-agile architectures can protect existing systems using overlay deployment models, centralized governance, and hybrid cryptographic approaches.

Also discussed in Quantum-Resilient Cybersecurity for Government Networks

Yes. QuProtect R3 is self-managed and runs entirely inside your environment, including air-gapped networks, with no outbound connection required. Legacy systems are read the same way as modern ones, because the sensor observes the connection rather than the host.

Yes. Reporting assesses each observed connection against the policy in force, including the CNSA 2.0 algorithm set, and shows what is in and out of policy as the traffic changes rather than at an audit interval.

A client can implement portions of our solution. For example, we currently offer management of data-at-rest (encryption/decryption) and file transfer. In the future, we will provide Hypertext transfer and remote shell. A client might say they only want data-at-rest and hypertext transfer, and we could do that for them. However, we will ensure that the clients know what they will miss.

No. The change happens at the network layer. Encryptors carry connections over post-quantum TLS 1.3, so the algorithms a system negotiates change without modifying application source code or swapping cryptographic libraries.

No. Sensors deploy alongside your infrastructure and read what systems negotiate on the wire. Application code, libraries and configuration stay as they are.

Yes. Sensors run in cloud, hybrid and on-premises environments under the same Orchestrator, and the inventory covers what a workload negotiates wherever it runs.

No. Crypto-agility addresses cryptographic risk that is already present: expiring certificates, weak ciphers, deprecated TLS versions and shadow cryptography nobody has inventoried. It also shortens the response time to AI-accelerated cryptanalysis, because an algorithm change is a policy update rather than an engineering project.

Yes. QuProtect runs in cloud, hybrid, on-premises and air-gapped environments. In cloud-native environments the encryptors form a service mesh, which is the approach NIST CSWP 39-upd1 section 4.3 describes.

QuProtect supports DORA’s ICT risk requirements for data in transit by producing evidence of the cryptography actually negotiated on each connection, and by changing it centrally when a control gap is found.

No. Sensors read handshake and negotiation metadata, including JA3 and JA4 TLS client fingerprints. Payload data is never decrypted or stored.

No. QuProtect R3 is software only. It deploys on infrastructure you already run, cloud, on-premises or air-gapped, with no appliances to procure or maintain.

By watching live traffic rather than an asset spreadsheet. In TLS 1.3 the server’s certificate is encrypted during the handshake, so a passive tool can see that a connection happened but often not which chain sat behind it. QuProtect Recon Sensor’s Active Discovery scans the endpoints the network is actually connecting to, retrieves each certificate and CA chain including TLS 1.3, flags chains issued by compromised or distrusted CAs, and shows which internal systems are touching affected sites on a dashboard.

Also discussed in When Trust Breaks: What 8 Compromised TLS Certificates Mean for Your Enterprise

Organizations create CBOMs using automated cryptographic discovery platforms that continuously identify and inventory cryptographic assets and dependencies across enterprise environments.

Also discussed in Cryptographic Bill of Materials (CBOM): Continuous Cryptographic Visibility for Crypto-Agility and Post-Quantum Readiness

QuProtect Reporting generates a CycloneDX v1.6 cryptographic bill of materials from the live inventory the sensors build, on demand and in machine-readable form. A CBOM is to cryptography what an SBOM is to software components: a list of what is present in the environment, exportable for an auditor or a federal cryptographic inventory submission.

QuProtect sensors observe live network traffic passively and build an inventory of the algorithms, protocols, certificates and key sizes in use.

A policy change takes effect as soon as the Orchestrator publishes it, and every encryptor in scope renegotiates its connections on the new cryptography from that point. No per-system projects, and no maintenance windows for the applications themselves.

PQC compliance means replacing vulnerable algorithms with quantum-resistant ones. Crypto-agility is broader: it means having the infrastructure and visibility to keep updating cryptography over time as standards evolve, algorithms change, or new risks emerge.

Also discussed in Beyond the Noise: Why Recent Quantum Advances Make Crypto-Agility a Board-Level Conversation

Only the browser half. Browsers receive revocation updates silently and require Certificate Transparency logs, so a forged certificate would struggle to pass there. Most non-browser software trusts a CA bundle stored on disk and does not check revocation by default: server-to-server API calls, CI/CD pipelines, containers with baked-in trust stores, self-updaters, and IoT or OT devices with frozen trust bundles. In testing, a forged certificate for a major payments API was accepted with default settings by curl, Python and Node.

Also discussed in When Trust Breaks: What 8 Compromised TLS Certificates Mean for Your Enterprise

No. The inventory updates continuously from live traffic, so it reflects what is on the wire today rather than what an audit found last quarter. PCI DSS 12.3.3 requires the inventory to be reviewed at least every 12 months; a live inventory makes that review a read rather than a project.

Also discussed in What PCI DSS 4.0 Requirement 12.3.3 Asks of Your Cryptography

No. Reports generate on demand from the inventory, which updates continuously from live traffic. PCI DSS 12.3.3 requires the inventory to be reviewed at least every 12 months; a live source makes that review a read rather than a project.

No. Certificate errors after patching usually mean the update is doing its job and a connection is chaining to a certificate that is no longer trusted. Turning verification off removes the protection the update restored. Cloudflare’s guidance is to test the real TLS path each service uses, update the trust store it reads (the OS ca-certificates package, Python certifi, Go, Node, Homebrew), and rebuild container images that bake in their own bundle.

Also discussed in When Trust Breaks: What 8 Compromised TLS Certificates Mean for Your Enterprise

Requirement 12.3.3 asks for the cryptographic inventory most banks lack. Discovery builds it passively in weeks, and the same platform remediates what it finds.

Also discussed in What PCI DSS 4.0 Requirement 12.3.3 Asks of Your Cryptography

An administrator sets a policy in the QuProtect Orchestrator specifying which algorithm applies and where. The Orchestrator distributes that policy to every encryptor in scope, and those encryptors renegotiate connections on the new algorithm.

Sensors deploy. Encryptors deploy as a sidecar alongside a workload, forming a service mesh, or as a gateway serving multiple endpoints. NIST CSWP 39-upd1 describes both: section 4.3, “Using Service Mesh in Cloud-Native Environments”, and section 4.6, “Using a Crypto Gateway for Legacy Systems”. Applications, the network and the infrastructure underneath are not replaced.

QuProtect R3 discovers the cryptography in use across a network, changes it to NIST post-quantum algorithms by policy at the network layer without application code changes, and generates a CycloneDX cryptographic bill of materials on demand.

A live inventory of algorithms, protocols and certificates per connection, exportable as a CycloneDX v1.6 CBOM, with a record of when each connection changed.

On October 17, 2026, a researcher reported that the private keys behind eight intermediate certificates from eMudhra, an Indian certificate authority, were weak enough to recover on a laptop in under a second. A normal key of that type has roughly 2^384 possible values; these had at most 255. Anyone holding the keys could mint a valid-looking certificate for any website. Google, Mozilla, Apple and Microsoft blocked the certificates within days. eMudhra attributed the fault to a bug in its key-generation ceremony script.

Also discussed in When Trust Breaks: What 8 Compromised TLS Certificates Mean for Your Enterprise

Remediation runs on the same platform. An administrator sets a policy in the Orchestrator, encryptors apply the new cryptography at the network layer, and the fix appears in the next export.

Remediation runs on the same platform. An administrator sets a policy in the Orchestrator, and encryptors apply the new cryptography at the network layer without application code changes. Discovery findings become policy changes rather than a project backlog.

Then the encryptor deploys as a gateway in front of it instead, which is the case NIST CSWP 39-upd1 section 4.6 addresses. Where neither a sidecar nor a gateway can sit on the path, QuProtect is not the answer for that system, and we will say so during scoping.

Cryptographic Exposure Management (CEM) is the practice of identifying, prioritizing, and reducing cryptographic risk across systems before vulnerabilities are exploited.

Also discussed in Google Just Showed Where Quantum Breaks First: Why Cryptographic Exposure Management Matters Now

Federal organizations typically evaluate crypto-agility platforms based on centralized governance, continuous discovery, hybrid cryptography support, and compatibility with legacy systems.

Also discussed in Quantum-Resilient Cybersecurity for Government Networks

An SBOM documents software components and dependencies. A CBOM specifically documents cryptographic dependencies such as algorithms, certificates, keys, cipher suites, protocols, and cryptographic libraries.

Also discussed in Cryptographic Bill of Materials (CBOM): Continuous Cryptographic Visibility for Crypto-Agility and Post-Quantum Readiness

QuProtect is complementary. EDR, SIEM, CASB and certificate lifecycle managers were not built to inventory or change the cryptography negotiated on the wire, which is the gap QuProtect covers.

You do. QuProtect R3 is self-managed: the platform runs in your environment, cloud, on-premises or air-gapped, and the inventory, like your CA keys, stays under your control.

You do. QuProtect R3 is self-managed: the platform, the inventory and every export stay in your environment, cloud, on-premises or air-gapped, under your control.

Your team does. QuProtect R3 is self-managed: it runs in your environment under your control, and your keys stay yours. QuSecure operates nothing on your behalf.

CBOMs help organizations identify cryptographic dependencies, prioritize modernization, and support phased migration toward quantum-resistant cryptography.

Also discussed in Cryptographic Bill of Materials (CBOM): Continuous Cryptographic Visibility for Crypto-Agility and Post-Quantum Readiness

Modern enterprise environments constantly change. Static inventories quickly become outdated, making continuous cryptographic discovery essential for maintaining operational visibility and governance.

Also discussed in Cryptographic Bill of Materials (CBOM): Continuous Cryptographic Visibility for Crypto-Agility and Post-Quantum Readiness

Crypto-agility allows agencies to adapt to evolving cryptographic standards and security threats without rebuilding infrastructure or disrupting operations.

Also discussed in Quantum-Resilient Cybersecurity for Government Networks

Cryptographic visibility helps organizations identify vulnerable cryptography, prioritize remediation, improve governance, operationalize crypto-agility, and support ongoing cryptographic modernization.

Also discussed in Cryptographic Bill of Materials (CBOM): Continuous Cryptographic Visibility for Crypto-Agility and Post-Quantum Readiness

Cryptographic standards change over time, and some algorithms that once appeared promising may later become vulnerable. A crypto-agile organization can update its cryptographic posture as standards and threats evolve, instead of rebuilding systems from scratch each time a change is required.

Also discussed in Beyond the Noise: Why Recent Quantum Advances Make Crypto-Agility a Board-Level Conversation

Yes, and that is the design case. Encryptors sit at the network layer and carry the connection over post-quantum TLS 1.3, so the application, its code, its libraries and its vendor relationship stay exactly as they are.

Boards should treat post-quantum cybersecurity as a risk-management issue because encrypted data, intellectual property, strategic communications, and customer information may remain valuable long after they are captured. Preparing for quantum risk through crypto-agility can reduce future disruption and help organizations move on their own timeline.

Also discussed in Beyond the Noise: Why Recent Quantum Advances Make Crypto-Agility a Board-Level Conversation